A four-month ban, issued in February 2025, was extended by three months and will now run until September.

On 22 February 2025, the DRC government imposed a four-month cobalt export ban in response to a sustained period of low prices and oversupply. On 21 June 2025, the ban was extended for a further three months, “…due to the continued high level of stock on the market”.

The details were set out in a press release from the Authority for the Regulation and Control of Strategic Mineral Substances’ Markets (ARECOMS) and signed by its chairman, Patrick Luabeya.
As things stand, no cobalt material will now leave the DRC until 21 September 2025. The press release stated that ARECOMS is expected to announce a decision modifying, extending or terminating the restrictions before this date.

Background to the ban

The DRC produced 72% of global cobalt mine supply in 2024. Record levels of mine production last year, driven principally by the ramp-up of CMOC’s giant Kisanfu copper-cobalt operation, left the intermediates market considerably oversupplied, with an estimated 75–100 kt of cobalt in hydroxide form sitting in stockpiles.

Despite record output, government tax revenues from cobalt halved between 2023 and 2024 due to depressed prices. This, alongside a broader aim to promote local value-add activities, prompted intervention.

These measures form part of a broader effort by DRC policymakers to capture greater value from its abundance of cobalt reserves. The government – typically via state-owned Gécamines – has been negotiating with companies to acquire stakes in existing operations or secure marketing rights to production.

There is also talk of potential consolidation, and smaller hydroxide plants may face licence reviews or revocations. Meanwhile, through Entreprise Générale du Cobalt (EGC) – granted a monopoly on the purchasing, processing and marketing of artisanal cobalt in 2019 – the state continues to pursue full control of ASM output to the market.

Market impact since the February restrictions

The ban introduced in February has already had an effect. Stocks are being drawn down although the tightening of the market has been gradual. This is partly because of the scale of the stocks sitting outside the DRC, and because some cobalt continued to flow into China after the 22 February deadline due to valid paperwork, with Chinese customs data showing imports of 51kt (gross) in March. In response to these dynamics, prices rose in Q1 (when the ban was introduced) but flattened off in Q2.

The timeline to reach ‘critical levels’ remains unclear. Project Blue data suggests that stockpiles ex-DRC will reach very low levels by the 21 September deadline if nothing else changes. And with cobalt hydroxide taking roughly 90 days to reach China for refining, exports will need to resume promptly else refined production will be impacted.

Next steps?

The DRC government has several typical options for managing exports:
1. Export requirements – setting minimum conditions for exporters, such as sustainability standards or community contributions.

2. Export quotas – limiting the volume each exporter is permitted to export.

3. Production quotas – restricting overall extraction volumes (difficult to implement for cobalt produced as a by-product of copper mining).

While the government’s actions thus far have had a positive impact on cobalt prices, these policies are not necessarily sustainable.

In-country inventories continue to build through this period and remain an overhang on cobalt prices. Challenging overland logistics are such that not all stockpiles would flood the market at once, but as was seen after the lifting of CMOC’s nine-month export ban in 2023, the cobalt units can find their way back to market more quickly than people expect.

A blanket ban is easier to police than a quota system. Enforcing export controls can be inefficient and costly for authorities, and without strong enforcement, material may leak out through informal channels.

While higher prices may be a goal, it is not clear at what price level the government would be satisfied. OPEC+ members have at times expressed oil price target levels, which allows the market to adjust expectations. The risks from significantly higher cobalt prices could be demand destruction or an increase in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) activity, both of which create additional volatility for industry participants.

Looking further ahead, any government guidance on potential 'value-add' policies would be constructive for market participants. A precedent can be seen in Indonesia's previous approach to copper, where export extensions were granted contingent on company commitments to develop in-country refining capacity – enabling continued export revenues while advancing its downstream development strategy.

Whether and how these policies are implemented remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: the cobalt supply chain continues to be unsettled by the sheer level of supply concentration from a single country.