Since Chinese authorities announced export controls on molybdenum powders in February 2025, exports have collapsed, falling from 288t (gross) in 2024 to only 10t (gross) in H1 2025.

The measures targeted dual-use materials with both civilian and military applications, citing national security and non-proliferation concerns. China’s restrictions coincided with rising demand from defence, fuelled by conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war and broader great-power competition between the USA, China, and Russia.

Molybdenum’s heat-resistance properties make it essential in alloys and steels used in tank armour, naval reactors, and aerospace superalloys, which together account for approximately 5% of global demand.

The restrictions focused specifically on molybdenum powders, a versatile intermediate used in both civilian industries and defence/aerospace; however, powders represent only a very small share of total molybdenum applications. In the defence sector, powders account for a limited 20% of molybdenum-related consumption. As a result, the immediate impact on prices was limited, with market trends continuing to follow seasonal demand and restocking activity.

The measures were widely viewed as a calculated, retaliatory response to US tariffs, rather than a market-tightening move. The larger risk lies in the potential for broader restrictions, which could disrupt global supply and push prices higher, given China’s position as the dominant producer. In contrast, the USA’s output remains modest and insufficient to meet domestic needs, leaving it reliant on imports from Peru, Chile, Mexico, and Canada.

Looking ahead, rising defence budgets and ongoing geopolitical tensions could lift defence-related demand to 6–8% of the market by 2030–2035, requiring around 30kt Mo by 2035. With the average mine producing only 4–5ktpy as a by-product, meeting this demand will likely accelerate investment in new projects outside China.