The potential merger between Rio Tinto and Glencore would create the world’s largest mining company based on current market capitalisation. Ahead of a 5 February 2026 deadline for Rio Tinto to formalise a proposal to acquire Glencore, Project Blue assesses what we consider three key factors relevant to this proposed combination: copper, coal, and culture.

As the interim period of the Anglo Teck merger continues, the potential Rio Tinto–Glencore combination has also been described as another strategic merger to build scale in copper exposure. Rio Tinto–Glencore would consolidate control over the companies’ globally diversified copper mine assets, blending Rio Tinto’s tier-one, long-life growth profile with Glencore’s diversified operating footprint, SX-EW capacity, and its own tier-one capacity in Collahuasi and Antamina. Pro rata, the result would be a copper major accounting for roughly 7% of global copper supply across Chile, Peru, the DRC, Mongolia, and the USA. Notably, the Anglo Teck merger accounts for 5% of global copper supply. 

• Rio Tinto’s copper production is dominated by its 30% stake in Escondida and majority ownership of Oyu Tolgoi, located in Chile and Mongolia, respectively, both ranking among the world’s largest copper operations by scale and resource depth. These assets are supplemented by Bingham Canyon in the USA, a mature but still material contributor of copper.
  
• Glencore, by contrast, brings a broader portfolio of mine assets, particularly in Chile, Peru, and the DRC. In Chile, Glencore holds a 44% stake in Collahuasi, a large-scale concentrate asset that sits among the world’s largest operations, alongside Lomas Bayas, which produces SX-EW cathode and adds operational flexibility rather than scale.
  
• In Peru, Glencore operates Antapaccay, whilst also holding a 33.75% interest in Antamina. Antamina adds substantial volumes to the combined group, albeit with a cost profile that sits higher on the curve than the largest South American concentrators, partially mitigated by ongoing investments to extend mine life until 2036.
  
• In the DRC, Glencore operates the sizeable Kamoto and Mutanda copper–cobalt operations. Although regulatory and governance risk is relatively high, these assets have benefited economically from higher grades and by-product credits.
  
• Finally, Glencore has announced plans to restart the Argentinian mine Alumbrera in Q4 2026, targeting first production in H1 2028. The operation is expected to produce roughly 75ktpy over a four-year mine life, with the restart designed to support the development of the MARA project through shared infrastructure and operational synergies.
  

In the current environment of high copper prices and improving long-term sentiment, driven by growing long-term copper demand, declining ore grades, and competition for tier-one resources, the dynamics appear to favour consolidation among the largest miners—the “buy not build” philosophy. However, is combining copper assets enough to warrant the merger, or could other factors matter more?

Rio Tinto exited coal entirely in 2018 following the sale of its remaining Queensland assets, aligning with its shareholder base at the time on a coal-free portfolio. By contrast, Glencore remains one of the world’s largest coal producers, and in fact added to its scale in 2023 through the acquisition of Teck’s Elk Valley metallurgical coal operations.

The coal strategy could therefore be a divisive issue for the transaction, as past actions by each company suggest a philosophical disagreement could be present. Eight years after Rio Tinto’s coal asset divestment, would its shareholders and new management team subscribe to Glencore’s view that it is more responsible for a major mining company to operate these assets, rather than divest to an entity that may have lower governance standards? The coal division continues to be a strong cash flow generator for Glencore, playing a similar role to Rio Tinto’s iron ore division. Furthermore, given that the Pilbara iron ore operations are becoming increasingly capital-intensive, in a declining iron ore price scenario, how would this impact the outlook for the combined asset base?

Finally, beyond mining assets, there is a difference in culture between the companies, which is well recognised within the industry. Rio Tinto has historically operated with a more conservative, engineering, and operations-led culture, whilst Glencore’s trading heritage has fostered a more commercially aggressive and opportunistic approach to capital allocation. This divergence introduces an additional integration risk that cannot be ignored. Although the appointment of Simon Trott as Rio Tinto’s new CEO may ease dialogue, his long tenure within Rio Tinto suggests that strategic decision-making could still lean closer to Rio Tinto’s historically risk-averse culture than to Glencore’s marketing-driven model.

In summary, blending scale in copper, long-life optionality, and a portfolio capable of navigating concentrate tightness and declining ore grades would position the group firmly alongside BHP and the emerging Anglo Teck entity as one of the industry’s dominant copper majors at a time when long-term demand visibility is improving.

However, other potentially more important factors that could impede a simple combination of the two companies should also be considered. The coal portfolio, Pilbara capital discipline, and corporate culture differences will shape the feasibility and final structure of any deal.